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Geo-identification: – Now They Know Where You Live
Dr Dan Jerker B. Svantesson
Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law Bond University
This article is based on a longer and more detailed article ’Geo-location technologies and other
means of placing borders on the ‘borderless’ Internet’, published in the John Marshall Journal
of Computer & Information Law
Imagine if website operators could know where you are located as you access their websites.
They could then make sure that the content they provided was tailored to people from your
location, and provided in the language spoken where you are located. Well, geo-identification –
the practice of identifying the geographical location of those who are active online – is not
science fiction. Rather, as we ‘surf the net’, we are frequently identified by location already
today. For example, if you visit www.google.com while in Australia, you are automatically
presented with the option of going to Google’s Australian website. This handy feature is
provided as a result of Google, or rather the geo-location technology employed by Google,
making an educated guess as to your location.
What has been discussed so far relate to the positive sides of geo-identification. However, this
practice also has very troubling effects on the Internet, and of course, massive privacy
implications.
How it works
If you are located in Australia and visit the website of US based TV network, Showtime
(www.sho.com), you will be greeted with the following message “We at Showtime Online
express our apologies; however, these pages are intended for access only from within the United
States”. As your web browser sends a request to access the website, it includes amongst other
things, your IP number. Showtime’s web server passes on your IP number to a provider of a geo-
location service, in what can be called a “location request”. Having built up a database in which
IP numbers are matched to geographical locations, the provider of the geo-location service is
able to make an educated guess as to your location. This information is passed on to Showtime in
what can be called a “location reply”, and armed with this information Showtime can determine
whether or not it will allow you to access the website.
Geo-identification in the courts
Geo-identification has played a central role in some court cases. In Macquarie Bank Limited &
Anor v Berg, the plaintiffs were seeking an injunction restraining the defendant from publishing
allegedly defamatory material on a particular website, and Simpson J stated that:
“The limitation [to publication occurring in NSW only] is ineffective. Senior council [for the
plaintiffs] acknowledged that he was aware of no means by which material, once published on
the Internet, could be excluded from transmission to or receipt in any geographical area. Once
published on the Internet material can be received anywhere, and it does not lie within the
competence of the publisher to restrict the reach of the publication1”.
There can be no doubt that the perceived lack of means of geo-identification played a central role
in the judge’s decision not to grant injunctive relief. In contrast, based on the expert evidence
provided, Justice Gomez in the Yahoo! Case2 , concluded that geo-location technologies are
sufficiently effective to allow the defendant to implement them to prevent access-seekers located
in France from accessing the Nazi memorabilia/junk in dispute.3 Here, the perceived existence of
feasible technical solutions was determinative.
It is submitted that the fact that courts have started to take account of geo-location technologies
is a huge incentive for continued development. This, in turn, is likely to lead to improved
accuracy, and this improved accuracy can motivate courts to place an even heavier emphasis on
these technologies.
Geo-identification’s implications for privacy
Those who thought they were anonymous while online have been both surprised and
disappointed over and over again. Considering the widespread use of technologies such as
cookies, those active on the Internet should perhaps have grown accustomed to the fact that what
they do online is being, or can be, supervised. Yet, that does not appear to be the case, and there
is no lack of studies indicating that people want a higher, not lesser, degree of privacy online.
While merely used to identify the country from which a person is accessing a particular website,
geo-location technologies are not particularly privacy intrusive. Indeed, their non-intrusive
nature is highlighted in the marketing of these products.4 However, as the accuracy rates
increase, and these technologies can identify Internet users on a city-level, or even street-level,
the privacy concerns grow. Currently, the accuracy of these products is difficult to gauge.
However, the providers of geo-location technologies indicate the potential accuracy to be very
high. For example, Digital envoy claims that their product “NetAcuity covers 99.9% of the
Internet, and provides accuracy rates of over 99% at a country level and approximately 92% at a
city-level worldwide” 5
There is a range of factors affecting the accuracy of geo-location technologies. Due to the dual
nature of the geo-location process, these factors can be divided into two categories: ‘source
problems’ and ‘circumvention problems’. The source problems are problems associated with
collecting accurate geo-location data. In relation to IP addresses, there is no equivalent to the
address registers listing physical addresses, or the phone registers listing phone numbers.
Consequently, when creating databases of geo-location information, one must rely on other, less
straightforward, methods. Obviously, the accuracy of the material in the geo-location databases
depend on, and can never be better than, the accuracy of the collection of that data. Thus, the
collection of background material is vital. Common methods of collecting relevant material
include, for example, gathering data from registration databases, 6 network routing information,
DNS systems, host name translations, ISP information and Web content.7All of these sources
may provide inaccurate information.8 The second category, circumvention problems, is probably
pretty self-explanatory – there are several methods for people with sufficient motivation9 and
knowledge to circumvent geo-location technologies. While some circumvention techniques are
technologically advanced (e.g. deep linking to streaming video content without accessing the
HTTP server 10 ), others are easy enough to be used by virtually anyone (e.g. anonymising
techniques 11 ) or even inherent in the system-structure (“tunnelling methods”12). With this in
mind, it will presumably always be possible to circumvent geo-location technologies. Having
said that, it should also be noted that for most uses, these technologies do not need to be hundred
percent accurate and it consequently does not always matter that they can be circumvented by a
limited group of people motivated to do so.
Privacy law’s implications for geo-identification
If an IP number is classed as “personal information”, the privacy laws of many states apply to the
collection, use and disclosure of the IP number. While the developers of geo-location
technologies argue that their products are “non-invasive”13 and “privacy safe”14 , it is unclear
how, for example, courts and authorities will view this issue. As the privacy protection
regulation of the European Union is one of the strictest in the world, and has been very
influential, it is here suitable to focus on EC law.
In his book, Data Protection Law – Approaching Its Rationale, Logic and Limits, Lee Bygrave
suggest that it is quite possible that IP addresses can constitute personal data as defined in Article
2(a) of the Directive 95/46/EC on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of
personal data and on the free movement of such data (1995)15 (“EC Directive”).16 Bygrave
identifies three criteria by which the EC Directive determines whether or not information
constitutes “personal data”:17 
• “the probability of identification”18 ;
• “the degree of technical ease with which identification can occur”19 ; and
• “the amount of time and effort demanded by the identification process”20.
As to the first criterion, it is particularly relevant to note that:
The possibility of a multiplicity of persons sharing a machine with an address registered in the
name of only one person is unlikely to disqualify that machine address from being treated as
personal data. Many numbers (eg, car registration and telephone numbers) which are formally
registered against the name of one specific person tend to be treated as personal data even if the
objects to which they directly attach are occasionally or regularly used by other persons.21
The first criterion consequently does not seem to exclude the possibility that IP addresses, in the
context of geo-location technologies, may constitute personal data. As to the second and third
criteria, Bygrave notes that the EC Directives definition of personal data focuses on the
capability of identification.22 Thus, the fact that the data is not actually used for identification is
irrelevant, and “any answer [as to whether criteria two and three have been met] will have to be
continually revised in light of technological-organisational developments; data which presently
could only be linked to an individual with great difficulty might be linked relatively easily in the
near future.”23 In light of this, it is only logical that Bygrave states that “the extent to which
clickstream data [such as IP addresses] may amount to personal data under the Directive is a
question of fact that is impossible to answer conclusively in the abstract.”24 The fact that some
courts have cut back on the literal scope of the personal data/information concept as it is defined
in legislation is adding further to the uncertainty.25
Thus, whether or not IP addresses used in the context of geo-location technologies constitute
personal data under the EC Directive and other relevant law, would appear to rest upon the
technical setup of the geo-location technology, and no definitive context-independent answer can
be given. However, it would seem arguable that the higher the accuracy of geo-location
technologies, the higher the likelihood that the IP number constitutes personal data (e.g. if a
particular geo-location service is accurate down to the street level, it is more likely to be using
data classed as ‘personal data’ than a geo-location technology that only is accurate on a country
level). Of course, it must also be noted that where the geo-location provider manages to connect
an IP number with a very precise location, the location information alone might constitute
personal information.
Concluding remarks
There can be no doubt that geo-identification can lower the level of anonymity afforded to
Internet users. At the same time, it seems possible that as soon as the practice of geo-
identification becomes so exact as to identify an individual, their use becomes restricted by
privacy laws.
Even apart from the privacy issues discussed above, the practice of identifying the geographical
location of Internet users has major implications. As these technologies becomes more and more
widely used, the Internet will inevitably change from a ‘borderless’ medium, to a
communications medium divided by borders, much like the real world.
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